For weeks now, Kenya’s youth, tribeless and leaderless, have taken to the streets in a powerful show of unity against the unpopular proposals contained in the now-abandoned Finance Bill 2024. What began as online discontent quickly turned into widespread street protests across various towns in Kenya, fueled by significant social media engagements. The result is a radical shift in how Kenyans protest, with the lack of clear leaders, a rejection of political manipulation, and a visible and vocal rejection of the status quo. In an age where the digital pulse often sets the rhythm of societal discourse, this article examines these campaigns, the evolution from digital dissent to physical demonstrations and the counter-campaigns aimed at quelling the rising tide of social justice. But first, let’s explore Kenya’s debt crisis.
According to Wizileaks, a corruption tracker by Africa Uncensored, in the 44 years between 1978 and 2022 Kenya has lost a total of about Ksh. 837.9 billion in 204 corruption scandals across three regimes, with former president Uhuru Kenyatta’s regime taking up about 66.7% of these cases – 136 scandals in total – amounting to Ksh. 644.4 billion.
The 2024 Medium Term Debt Management Strategy (MTDS) shows that Kenya’s present value of public debt was 68.2% by January 2024, against the approved debt limit of 55% to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This suggests that by January 2024, the Kenyan government had borrowed 13.2% more than was planned. As a result, Kenya’s debt levels have escalated rapidly, reaching Ksh. 10.5 trillion as of April 2024, equivalent to 65.2% of the GDP. The external debt stock alone increased by Ksh. 35.39 billion in 2024.
Corruption has significantly worsened Kenya’s financial burden, putting the country in a position of great economic distress, especially since the public funds being lost are usually in the form of loans that have to be repaid without the economic gain that would have been achieved had the funds been properly used. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) highlights that Kenya’s growth is limited by widespread corruption and some questionable economic decisions of past years. It adds that debt repayments now eat nearly half of the government’s budget, crimping the country’s ability to sustain the necessary development projects for growth.
In the proposed Ksh. 4.1 trillion budget for FY 2024/2025, the Kenyan government allocated Ksh. 1.2 trillion towards the Consolidated Fund, which includes debt repayment. According to the Institute of Public Finance, this is a 4% increase from the previous budget, attributed to an increase in allocation towards debt servicing.
“The main drivers for the increased budget include an additional Ksh. 89.9 billion on interest payments on public debt as well as a Ksh. 70.7 billion increase in development expenditure,” the budget statement for FY 2024/2025 reads.
At the beginning of 2024, the World Bank’s Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) considered Kenya’s public debt sustainable. However, the overall and external ratings for risk of debt distress remained high. Being at a high risk of debt distress means there is the possibility of a country defaulting on its public debt obligations. It also means that the country must establish stringent fiscal measures to manage the debt crisis and stabilise the economy. One of these measures is reducing the fiscal deficit – the gap between a country’s expenditures and revenues.
According to KPMG, the 2024/2025 budget estimates reveal that the National Treasury targets to reduce the fiscal deficit from 5.7% in the financial year 2023/2024 to 3.3% in the financial year 2024/2025.
#RejectFinanceBill2024
The #RejectFinanceBill campaign emerged as a direct response to this bill’s proposals, which caused concern that the proposed tax hikes would be borne disproportionately by lower and middle-income earners. A report by NENDO shows that between June 12, 2024, and July 1, 2024, #RejectFinanceBill2024, #OccupyParliament and #RutoMustGo had a total of 24,989,246 million mentions on X. These three hashtags gained prominence in the ongoing discourse, which started from discontent with the fiscal measures of the bill to broader grievances against President William Ruto’s administration. The data from NENDO shows that mentions of #RejectFinanceBill2024, #OccupyParliament, and #RutoMustGo peaked on June 25, 2024, when protesters stormed Parliament buildings.
As online pressure mounted, it became clear that the public’s dissatisfaction with the bill was not confined to social media platforms. The phrase ‘salimia’ (‘to greet’ in Swahili) emerged as a strategy in this campaign to share the contact information of elected leaders, arguing that Kenyans elect these leaders and that they should be accountable to the public as their leaders. The term ‘salimia’ took on a new meaning, referring to the act of ‘getting in touch’ with someone directly to call them out for something they did or express dissatisfaction. This action was based on the belief that leaders should be accessible and responsive to the people, and their contacts were being shared with the public to urge them not to vote for the Finance Bill 2024.
Before the first protests on June 18, 2024, the mobile numbers of some Kitui County elected leaders were shared in this post urging citizens to remind them to attend Parliamentary hearings and vote against the Finance Bill. Another similar post by the same account published contact details of elected leaders from Narok County asking Kenyans to call or text their members of Parliament.
More posts were published, including one on June 12, 2024, with mobile numbers of MPs from various constituencies. Two other such posts were shared by this account. These posts were later republished here. These posts attached below, have the mobile numbers edited out.
A Google reverse image search on this image listing the mobile numbers of 94 members of parliament shows that accounts on X, Instagram and Facebook widely reshared it.
It is important to note that these posters were not necessarily part of a coordinated campaign except for the posts that shared them alongside the hashtags #RejectFinanceBill and #RejectFinanceBill2024. However, the traction gained from this strategy was quickly picked by other users, such as those behind the hashtag #RespectMyHustle, which called for action by the government to protect Kenyans’ businesses. The rationale was that these leaders are ultimately answerable to their constituents, who are their employers. Despite the widespread sharing of contact information, Piga Firimbi could not ascertain whether the numbers belonged to the said persons.
Legal and ethical considerations emerge over the widespread sharing of personal phone numbers. A statement published on X by the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner of Kenya (ODPC) cautioned that publicly sharing an individual’s personal information violates Article 31 of the Kenyan Constitution and the Data Protection Act of 2019.
According to Article 31 (c) and (d), every person has the right not to have information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed; or the privacy of their communication infringed. The Data Protection Act of 2019 classifies personal identifiers such as mobile numbers, addresses, date of birth, and ID numbers as sensitive and private.
This trend persisted extending beyond elected leaders to include journalists, activists, and police officers, under various circumstances. By sharing the contact details of police officers, the public aimed to disrupt the anonymity that often shields state agents from accountability. A particularly stark example is a video captured on June 18, 2024, which shows a police officer launching a teargas canister directly at journalists covering the protests. In response, his details, including his ID number, mobile number, KRA number, police force number, and family details were shared online. A reverse image search reveals posts with a poster with these details primarily shared on X. This incident highlights the importance of transparency and accountability in law enforcement amid ethical and legal considerations of sharing the officer’s details.
Beyond organising, mobilising and coordinating these protests, social media platforms such as X, TikTok, Facebook and Instagram have played a crucial role in documenting instances of police brutality, abductions, human rights violations and the looting and destruction of property. Research done between July 16 and 17, 2024, by TIFA, shows that across eight regions in Kenya, 75% of Kenyans believe that the police used excessive force during the anti-tax protests.
Among the incidents of police excesses were cases of abductions which sparked public outcry. Hashtags calling for the release of abducted and arrested protesters, online activists and content creators were pivotal in amplifying cases of missing persons, and arbitrary arrests. According to the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) as of July 16, a total of 50 and 413 injuries were reported. Additionally, there were 59 cases of abductions and 682 cases of arbitrary arrests.
An analysis by the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) of posts on X regarding abductions between June 23 and June 29, 2024, had original mentions ranging from 987,000 to 87,000, with the highest having 46.5 million views.
On June 30, 2024, President William Ruto addressed the issue of abductions, extrajudicial killings and arbitrary arrests.
During the address, he admitted, “Any life that is lost is something that should bother anybody beginning with myself, and it is why I have told you, that when I came into office, I said three things. Number one, I said there will be no extrajudicial killing in Kenya.”
Despite this acknowledgement, the president’s claim that there have not been any cases of extrajudicial killings is inaccurate.
Even amid the utility of social media in not only documenting happenings but also exposing excesses, this utility was curtailed in what was largely seen as the government’s attempt to throttle internet use. On June 25, 2024, at the height of the 3rd day of protests, there was an internet slowdown suspected to have been orchestrated by the government.
The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNRC) defines internet shutdowns as deliberate measures by a government or on behalf of a government to disrupt access to, and the use of, information communications systems online. This can either be complete blackouts or limiting mobile service to 2G which makes it extremely difficult to use internet services.
The Internet Outage Detection and Analysis (IODA) reported a drop of 40% in internet connectivity at around 4:00 PM across at least 20 networks. Later that day, both Safaricom PLC and Airtel Kenya published a press release notifying Kenyans of the internet outage, owing to an undersea cable outage.
The UNHRC regards access to the internet as an essential component of the freedom of expression and access to information. It holds that internet shutdowns can disrupt access to critical services, and hinder the ability of people to communicate especially in times of crisis and civil unrest.
#GenocideMedia
Beyond incidents of police brutality, widespread disinformation, and a likely government-initiated internet throttling, the media also had its share of mishaps. The media plays an important role in covering protests and civil unrest. the Kenyan media has documented real-time, and diverse perspectives around these protests, keeping the local and international audiences informed. However, Kenyan media houses and journalists have faced attacks and threats regarding their reporting. There have been reports of intimidation, harassment, and physical assaults on journalists, activists, and media houses.
One instance of police harassment is documented in a video published by Citizen TV, on June 18, 2024. The footage shows, journalist and activist Hanifa Farsafi being arrested while participating in the protests alongside other protesters. Hanifa can be heard questioning the plain-cloth officers about her offence and that of the other protesters before being detained. On the same day, another video published by Nation Media captures a plain-cloth officer firing and injuring a journalist covering these protests.
Almost a month later on July 16, 2024, Catherine Wanjeri Kariuki, a journalist at K24 was shot while covering these protests in Nakuru County. A few days later, Tom Mukhwana a journalist at Africa Uncensored was hit by a teargas canister launched by a police officer. In a statement addressing these violations the president of the Kenya Editors Guild, Zubeida Kananu highlighted that “The threats we face are not limited to online harassment, there have been numerous incidents of physical attacks against journalists. Despite these dangers, we must remain steadfast in our duty to provide the public with accurate and timely information. Our commitment to journalism must not waver in the face of such adversity.”
Genocide media was a coordinated narrative that emerged labelling Citizen TV as a ‘genocide media’. This term was used interchangeably with the phrase ‘salimia’ which has so far been used as a form of intimidation. By framing Citizen TV as a source of inflammatory content, posts amplifying this narrative aimed to discredit their reporting.
Moreover, posters within this campaign included mobile numbers of Citizen TV journalists, constituting a form of doxxing. They read, “tuma salamu kwa,” which translates to; “send greetings to” or “get in touch with.” These posts accused Citizen TV of biased reporting, continuously spreading lies, perpetuating misinformation, and inciting and promoting violence.
This coordinated campaign against Citizen TV used similar posters and videos. Some of these were videos and images with headlines attributed to Citizen TV. One headline read, “Journalists attack police”. This video shows a police officer outside the Nation Centre dispersing protesters while journalists covered.
Moreover, identical posters threatening to storm Citizen TV’s premises shared, read, ‘Twende tusalimie’, translated as, ‘let’s go and greet.’ This statement builds up on the phrase, ‘salimia’ which means physically getting in touch with Citizen TV. This reverse image search captures posts with this poster, mostly published on X.
One tweet with this poster reads, “Salimia Citizen, it’s time to call out #GenocideMedia for their biased and incendiary reporting. Their coverage of maandamanos is fueling unrest and damaging our economy. We deserve better from our media.”
Another with the same poster reads, “Encouraging discussions and peaceful resolutions should be prioritized over sensationalizing conflicts, #GenocideMedia Salimia Citizen.”
This one, just like the other two attaches the poster with a post reading, “Citizen TV is disrupting peaceful protests by spreading misinformation and inciting violence. Their content is fueling conflict and hatred, endangering our nation’s peace. It’s time for the Media Council of Kenya to take legal action against them #GenocideMedia Salimia Citizen.”
A more direct poster shared under this hashtag read, ‘Occupy Citizen Television,’ shared by posts here, here, here, here and here.
Coordinated campaigns often use tactics which involve sharing misleading images and fabricated digital cards. These digital cards resemble the original ones, in this case from Citizen TV. Another batch of posters used in this campaign was a digital card reading, ‘THE GENOCIDE MEDIA’ and ‘TIME TO LOOT’ with Citizen TV’s strapline showing a man carrying a fridge that was allegedly looted during the ongoing protests in Kenya. A post with this digital card accused Citizen TV of reporting false information and called upon the Media Council of Kenya to take action against this media house. These same accusations are repeated in this post.
A reverse image search shows that this image was taken in 2021 in South Africa when protests broke out after former President Jacob Zuma handed himself to police for contempt of court.
The impact of these coordinated efforts is identified in another image taken out of context and used to create more digital cards within this campaign. This tweet shared an image of young men with machetes with a headline reading, ‘THE GENOCIDE MEDIA, PEACE IS SUSPENDED.”
Another tweet with the same digital card alleged that this image was shared on a live broadcast. It reads, “What does the country get when Peace is Suspended and such images are aired on National TV? Shame on you Citizen Tv #GenocideMedia.” The same claims are similarly repeated in this post.
A reverse image search shows that this image in question captured by Ben Curtis, a photojournalist at Associated Press, dates back to 2008. It was taken in the aftermath of the post-election violence experienced in Kenya, in 2007.
Another image taken out of context used to paint Citizen TV as #GenocideMedia is one, taken in 2017. Despite this, the image is being used as a current image from the current protests in Kenya. A headline attached to this photo reads, ‘The Genocide Media Acha Kenya Ichomeke.’ This post alleges that Citizen TV falsely reported the protests as peaceful, despite clear evidence of looting and destruction. Another similar post adds that the media organization’s, “biased coverage is contributing to societal harm” and that it has offered a platform for amplification of violent protests.
The consistency in the design, and narrative across these cards which are shared in mass suggests a coordinated campaign effort from a common origin. The central element of this campaign is the hashtag used and the narrative that Citizen TV as a media organisation has fueled violence in the ongoing protests in Kenya by airing biased and inaccurate broadcasts. The repurposing of the phrase ‘salimia’, in the case of #GenocideMedia targeting Citizen TV, serves as a threat to storm newsrooms and disrupt activities in media houses.
With these protests reflecting the dynamic and fluctuating nature of online engagements, a notable trend is how online campaigns transition to street demonstrations, and for the online conversations to pick up again after the demonstrations are over, in the form of X Spaces and dialogue. There has been a significant amount of engagement with these posts and the content within, and what we can see is that the online activity has become more of an extension of offline activity than ever before, and as a result, we may see more activity of this kind.
Add comment